...continu'd, which he calls himself, tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me. But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture...of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their...

...aside some metaphysicians of this kind', — that is, who feel and believe, that they have a soul, — 'I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that...of different perceptions, which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. — There is properly no simplicity...

...impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea.76 l may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that...of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a 72 Locke, "Of Identity", 335 definiert Person: "[A] thinking...

...catch itself at any time without perception and never can observe anything but the perception. . . . It may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind that...but a bundle or collection of different perceptions. . . . Here, it seems that if Hume's argument is to make sense at all, the bundle, which is mistakenly...

...fugitive perceptions, from which coherent identity is only an enabling fiction constructed by memory. Men are 'nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement', he affirms. Then his metaphor...

...a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception.5 From this Hume concluded that we are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity . . . The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively...

...category which in this context was the supposed basis of the self) and arguing instead that 'mankind . . . are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement'. There is not, he adds, 'any...

...returned to the empiricist scepticism about the self expressed in 1739 by David Hume, who called it 'nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement'.1 In a book whose findings...

...into the language of sense-data and images. In the more metaphysical language of Hume a mind can be 'nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement". Some of us may doubt whether...

...continued, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me. But setting aside some metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture...of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity and are in a perpetual flux and movement . . . There is properly no...