load the piece; but, while drawing out the moist sponge, it is of vital importance that the gunner of the left should close the vent with the finger, protected by the stall, or leather covering; in order that any fire, previously remaining in the gun, may be extinguished, by the transient exhaustion of the air. The gunner of the left, having aimed the piece, pricks the cartridge, and inserts a priming tube in the vent; when No. 3., having lighted his portfire, touches off the gun, at the command to that effect.*

The School of the Battery, comprehends the manœuvres of several pieces in concert; usually six pieces, manned by an artillery company. Such a battery is subdivided into three sections, of two pieces each; and sometimes into two half batteries. When the horses' heads are directed to the front of the line, and the pieces point to the rear, the battery is said to be in line: but when the reverse is the case, the battery is said to be in battery. In both cases, the caissons are in rear of the guns; which are placed at such a distance apart that the sections may wheel to the right or left, and occupy no greater space in column than in line. It will be seen that in order to advance, from the position in battery, the horses must first turn, with the pieces, and face to the front; and that, in order to resume a position in battery, they must turn again, and face to the rear. Το form a column of sections, fronting to the right, the command is, "by section, right wheel; MARCH;" when the first section of the battery in line, by wheeling to the right, becomes the head of the column; and the other sections cover it, in its rear. Of various other evolutions, depending on similar principles; and of the manœuvres of horse artillery; as well as the exercise of mortars and garrison pieces; and the art of gunnery; our limits forbid any farther notice.

§3. Cavalry Tactics, includes the exercises and evolutions of mounted troops, other than horse artillery, in marching and fighting, on horseback. It embraces, of course, many exercises in common with those of the mounted artillery as the manége, or management of horses and art of riding, and the general principles of formation. Cavalry is usually drawn up in companies, or troops, of from 50 to 100 men each; two of which form a squadron, corresponding to a grand division of infantry; and eight of which usually form a regiment. The grades and titles of cavalry officers, for the most part, correspond to those of the officers of artillery and infantry. A troop of cavalry is usually paraded in two ranks, the front and rear; with intervals of six inches between the men in the same rank; and a distance of three feet between the ranks, in close order, and twelve feet, in parade order; but in open order, the rear rank is distant a half squadron's length from the front rank, so that on wheeling by troops, to the right or left, these ranks would form one continuous line.

A man in the front rank, and the man who covers him in the rear rank, together constitute a file; and when the line forms column, by filing to the right or left, and taking distance, the two men of the same file are abreast of each other: but the column, in this case,

*The seventh and eighth men, or Nos. 5 and 6, are stationed opposite to the limber: but, in action, their duty is to supply the piece with ammunition, from its caisson, or ammunition waggon, in the rear.

is much longer than the line, which it previously formed. When the troop is all formed continuously in one rank, it is said to form rank-entire: but when the men of each rank are divided into triads, or divisions of three each, they are said to form ranks by threes; the advantage of which is, that three men occupy as much breadth as depth, and can wheel as one body, on their own ground; the centre man being the pivot. A troop thus arranged, would present, after wheeling, a column of six men abreast, three of the front rank and three of the rear; who by wheeling back again by threes, would resume their places in line. To these explanations, we can only add, that the evolutions of cavalry are quite analogous to those of infantry and artillery; and that the words of command in these three arnis should be made to correspond as nearly as possible. (p. 513.)

ear.

It remains to speak briefly of the Sword Exercise; which is of the greatest importance to cavalry, in making a charge. At the command, draw-swORD, this weapon is seized by the hilt, drawn from the scabbard, and extended to the front, with the point a little raised, and the edge towards the right; it is then brought to a vertical position, the edge to the left, and the sword hand raised, with the thumb under the chin; and finally carried forward, by extending the arm, holding it still vertical, and the edge turned towards the horse's left To slope-swORD, the hand is then raised a little, and the back of the sword rested on the right shoulder: and to carry-swORD, is to bring it again to the last position of drawing. In the motion to guard, the sword is first raised vertically, bringing the hand to the left breast; then extended forward, and held nearly horizontal, pointing a little to the left, with the edge turned to the right, and inclined slightly downwards. In the St. George, or head protect, the sword is held above the head, pointing over the left shoulder. The six cuts, are different strokes of the sword; cut one, downwards to the left; cut two, downwards to the right; cut three, upwards to the left; cut four, upwards to the right; cut five, horizontally to the left; and cut six, horizontally to the right. The pistol exercise, we have no farther room to notice.

CHAPTER IV.

STRATEGY.

STRATEGY, or Grand Tactics, is that branch of the Arts of War which relates to the more extended operations of armies during a compaign; or, in other words, to the duties of a general commanding in chief. The name is derived from the Greek, orpatos, an army; and ayw, I lead; or from otpaτnyia, of corresponding signification. It is a branch of high importance; to which the three preceding branches are entirely subordinate and it should, therefore, be studied not only by high commanders, but by those who aspire to high command. Geotactics relates to the training of individual corps, or their component parts; but Strategy, or Grand Tactics, relates to the combining of different corps, to form an army, and the

means or modes of employing them so as to produce the greatest result. The principles of Strategy, are derived partly from reasoning on the effects of certain measures; but chiefly from experience as to the effect of these and similar measures, in cases where they have actually been tried.

Strategy is an art of ancient origin, though it has but recently been treated as a branch distinct from Tactics. It was practised by Alexander and Cæsar; and in the arrangement of the Grecian phalanx, and the Roman legion, as well as in the marshalling of modern armies. (p. 498.) In the Grecian phalanx, the hoplitai, or heavy armed infantry, clad in full armor, with broad shields, straight swords, and long spears, appear to have occupied the rear; while the peltastai, or targeteers, with smaller shields and spears, held the middle place; and the psiloi, or light troops, armed with darts, arrows, and slings, were posted in front, to begin the action. The hippeis, or cavalry, either protected the flanks, or formed a reserve. The Roman legion was, in early times, drawn up in three ranks; the hastati, or young men, in front; the principes, or middle aged next; and the triarii, or veterans, in the rear. They were all armed with a shield, sword, spear, and two javelins; but the hastati bore the largest shields, and the triarii, the longest swords and spears. The velites, or light troops, had no particular place assigned them, but fought as skirmishers, with javelins, slings, and stones, or bows, and arrows. Of ancient marches, encampments, and battles, we have no room here to speak.

The great elements of Strategy, or the combining of strength with rapidity of motion, were first developed by Maurice of Nassau ; practised and extended by the Duke of Marlborough; farther improved by Frederick the Great; and finally perfected by Napoleon; who taught them, at last, even to his enemies. The works of Lloyd and Tempelhoff, describing the military operations of Frederick the Great, are perhaps the earliest modern writings in which these elements are formally stated and explained. Bülow, in his work on the Theory of War, appears to have committed some grave errors; such as in maintaining that retreats should be made in separate corps, diverging from each other. Jomini opposes this and other maxims of his; and insists that the forces should be kept concentrated, and led by the shortest way, to attack the enemy in overwhelming masses in proof of which he cites many of the most brilliant exploits of Napoleon; and might have cited those of his last successful antagonist, the Duke of Wellington. In our own country, the most instructive lessons may be drawn from the prudent measures of Washington, compared with those which proved fatal to Burgoyne and Cornwallis; while they show that a war of self-defence has greatly the advantage over one of invasion or conquest.

Our further remarks on Strategy, will be arranged under the heads of Preliminary Operations; Marches and Encampments; and Battles and Retreats.

§1. Among the Preliminary Operations of a campaign, or season's warfare, are the organization of an army or armies, and the devising of plans of operation. European armies often comprise

many corps; each corps consisting of one or more divisions; each division, of two or more brigades; and each brigade, of two or more regiments or battalions. In smaller armies, a single brigade, or even a battalion, may be considered as forming a distinct corps. 'The principal arms, so called, which compose the strength of an army, are the infantry, artillery, cavalry, and engineering or fortification. As cavalry and artillery are far more expensive than infantry, the latter constitute the great mass of modern armies. Thus, the whole French army, in 1804, consisted of about 500,000 infantry; 20,000 artillery; 70,000 cavalry; and 10,000 engineers, including sappers and miners. The regular army, authorized to be raised by our government, in the war of 1812, would have amounted to 62,448 men; but the number in service at any one time was far less. The present army of the United States, consists of eight regiments of infantry, four of artillery, and two of dragoons; which, with the staff corps, form a nominal aggregate of 12,539 men.

Troops are raised or recruited, either by voluntary enlistment, or by draughts, or conscriptions, under the direction of the civil government. Although the militia are the great resource for the defence of a nation, still they cannot generally be depended upon, until they have been drilled and practised in warfare, so as to acquire somewhat of the character of regular troops. The importance of drilling a sufficient body of our militia, to be ready to suppress insurrection, or repel invasion, seems to be too evident, and urgent, to require an argument here in its favor. The means of providing supplies of every kind for an army, have already been indicated, as far as our limits would allow, in treating of Hoplistics. (p. 490 and 492). The Staff Corps and Departments of our own service, are 1. The Adjutant General's department; 2. The Inspector General's department; 3. The corps of Engineers; 4. The corps of Topographical Engineers; 5. The Ordnance department; 6. The Quartermaster department; 7. The Subsistence department: 8. The Purchasing department; 9. The Medical department; and 10. The Pay department. The chief officers of these different corps and departments, present with the army, together with the chaplains and the aides-de-camp (or aidecamps) of the commander, constitute the Staff of the army; on which its efficiency greatly depends. The Adjutant General, keeps all records relating to the personnel of the army, or the officers and men; and issues the orders and regulations directed by the Commander-in-chief. The duties of the Inspector General, are implied by his title; and can here require no farther mention.

Before taking the field, it is customary for the commander to digest a plan of operations, proposing the accomplishment of certain objects, and based on the best information which he can obtain ; but liable to alteration from the various and uncertain chances of war. As such a plan generally has reference to a whole season, it is also called a plan of the campaign. It depends upon a knowledge of his own strength, and that of the enemy; and a knowledge of the country which is to be the field or theatre of war. If the objects of the campaign be purely defensive, as the protection of a certain

region, or frontier, or fortress, or chain of fortresses, with supplies in the vicinity, the plan is then limited to the best arrangement of the troops for this object; recollecting that they should not be so much subdivided, nor so far separated, as to expose them to defeat in detail; and that the best defence may sometimes be made by carrying the war into the enemy's own country, or meeting him in advance.

But if the objects proposed be offensive, the plan of operations becomes much more complicated. Considering the whole field or theatre of war as one great parade ground, the side towards the enemy is called its front; the opposite side, its rear; and the other sides are called the right and left flanks. If the army draws its supplies and recruits from the rear, the space where they are assembled, or whence they are procured, is called the basis of operations. As the army advances, the roads or routes by which these supplies are carried forward to overtake it, are called lines of operation. As these lines usually require to be guarded by detachments, stationed at successive posts along them; and as the army, if obliged to retreat, ought generally to be concentrated at some one position; it is generally preferable to have only one principal line of operations, which may then be guarded more strongly. The posts, for this purpose, should of course be carefully selected; and, if possible, fortified, at least with field works.

§ 2. Marches, are generally performed in column, on account of the narrowness of roads; and, if long, they require nightly Encampments. to give rest to the troops. The column of march, should be so disposed that it may readily deploy, or display in line, by oblique marches of its centre and rear to the right and left, if it should be necessary to give or sustain battle. It should be protected by strong van and rear guards; with scouts and skirmishers on the flanks, and in all the environs; to guard against surprise, and gain useful information. The greatest precautions are required, in passing forests, ravines, bridges, or other defiles; where an enemy might lie in ambush, and where there would be no room to form in battle array. The baggage train, should be placed either in the column, or so near it that it may be speedily defended, in case of an attack; being of course well guarded. Detachments are often required, as guards, or escorts, or foragers and they should neither be so weak as to be easily overpowered, nor yet so strong as greatly to weaken the main army.

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The crossing of rivers, in presence of an enemy, and especially in retreating, is one of the most hazardous warlike operations. To the means of constructing bridges for this purpose, where bridges are wanting, we have already briefly referred. (p. 497.) If they are to be built in the face of an enemy on the opposite shore, he must be driven back by a powerful cannonade; by which the troops that are to cross should also be protected. If we are to retreat across a river, with the enemy pursuing, it is very desirable to have defensive works near the entrance to the bridge; forming a téte-de-pont, by which the enemy may be held in check, and within which our troops may be sheltered, till all have crossed except the rear guard; which then evacuates the works, and destroys the bridge, the moment that it has crossed it. It is only by keeping the enemy at a