Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

WAYNE COUNTY SAVINGS BANK vs. SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 5 OF MIKADO TOWNSHIP.

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-LIABILITY ON BONDS-ORGANIZATION OF DISTRICTSREORGANIZATION-EFFECT CHANGE OF TOWNSHIP.

The act of the legislature in detaching a part of the territory of a township and erecting therefrom a new township of another name does not have the effect of putting an end to the school district organizations in the detached territory, and the holder of bonds issued thereafter by a district in such territory may recover thereon notwithstanding a subsequent reorganization of the district.

Error to Alcoma; Connine, J. Submitted February 20, 1908. (Docket No. 69). Decided May 1, 1908.

Assumpsit by the Wayne County Savings Bank against School District No. 5 of Mikado Township for the amount of a bond. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Charles R. Henry, for appellant.

Fred A. Beede (De Vere Hall, of counsel), for appellee.

MOORE, J.

The plaintiff brings this suit on a school district bond and coupons connected therewith, alleged to have been made by the defendant school district, on the 5th day of October, 1888. The case was tried before the Circuit Judge, who made the following findings of fact and law:

I conclude from the foregoing:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

"1. That defendant is obligated to pay plaintiff the bond sued upon with interest at seven per cent per annum.

"2. That plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the sum of one thousand two hundred dollars and sixty-three cents, with interest at the rate of seven per cent per annum from July 5, 1906, with costs."

The case is brought here by writ of error.

It is the claim that the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence. It is a matter of common knowledge that in a new country it often happens that the officers of a school district are not careful business men, and do not always appreciate the importance of accurate records of what is done at the school meetings and by the school officers; and while the records in this case are not as full and complete as could be desired, still a fair inference from them and from the testimony of the witnesses sustains the findings of the circuit judge. Wood v. La Rue, 9 Mich. 160; Schmidt v. Miller, 22 Mich. 278; O'Connor v. Beckwith, 41 Mich. 657; Wertin v. Crocker, 47 Mich. 642; Cook v. Burnett. 83 Mich. 251.

Counsel for defendant make the following claim; we quote from the brief:

"On June 18, 1887, the territory embraced in the defendant school district in this suit was detached, with other territory, from the township of Greenbush, and made into the township of Mikado. All territory in the new township then was void of school district territorial organization.'

And it is argued that, until the new township institutes and sets in motion a complete school system, there are no school districts in the new township, citing, in support of this contention, People v. Ryan, 19 Mich. 203. An examination of that case will show it does not sustain the doctrine above stated.

In considering a question like the one involved here, Justice Campbell, speaking for the court, used the following language:

"We do not think this makes any difference. The respondents are in law the same corporation as the old and larger district. The only effect of these acts was to detach certain lands from the district but not to change its corporate identity. We have already disposed of this question in Maltz v. Board of Education of Wilson Township, 41 Mich. 547, in which we held that the debts could not be parceled out in a proceeding in the courts so as to give creditors a remedy against any but the present respondents. A debt once existing must remain a debt against the corporation that created it, and its obligation is not destroyed by a change in the corporate limits. If contribution is required, it must be obtained by the corporation and not by its creditors, unless otherwise provided by law." Turnbull v. School District, 45 Mich. 496.

The following cases stand for the same proposition; Brower v. Palmer, 13 Mich. 104; Halbert v. School District, 36 Mich. 421; Maltz v. Board of Education of Wilson Township, 41 Mich. 547.

They justify the judgment of the lower court.

Judgment is affirmed.

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF DETROIT vs. MOROSS. 1

EMINENT DOMAIN CONDEMNATION OF SCHOOL SITE DETROIT BOARD OF EDUCATION.

If the provisions of the primary school law authorizing the condemnation of school sites are extended to the city of Detroit by Section 4774, 2 Comp. Laws, there is nothing in the statutes relieving the Detroit Board of Education from obtaining the concurrent vote of two-thirds of the qualified voters of the district in the designation and purchase of a site, as provided by section 4665, and proceedings by the board without such vote are unauthorized.

Certiorari to Wayne; Rohnert, J. Submitted October 22, 1907. (Docket No. 112). Decided December 10, 1907. Rehearing denied March 31, 1908.

Petition by the Board of Education of the city of Detroit against Julia V. Moross and others to condemn certain real estate for a school site. From an order overruling demurrers to the petition, respondents being certiorari. Reversed, and proceedings quashed. Clark, Jones & Bryant, Augustus C. Stellwagen,and Elmer L. Allor, for appellants. P. J. M. Hally (T. E. Tarsney, of counsel), for appellee.

HOOKER, J.

Property in Detroit belonging to the respondents was condemned for a school site through proceedings in the circuit court, which proceedings were removed by them to this court by certiorari. It is claimed that the circuit court had no jurisdiction, for the following

reasons:

1. The act under which the board of education filed its petition has no force in Detroit. 2. The recorder's court has exclusive jurisdiction in all cases to which said board is a party.

3. If said court would otherwise have jurisdiction, the provisions of the act have not been complied with, and the court did not, therefore, obtain jurisdiction.

Our understanding is that the only authority for an attempt to purchase or condemn this land for a school site consisted of resolutions of the board of education, which counsel for the respondents assert to be insufficient. The petitioner bases its claim of authority upon the primary school law (2 Comp. Laws, $4774) which provides:

"All provisions of this act shall apply and be in force in every school district, township, city and village in this State, except such as may be inconsistent with the direct provisions of some special enactment of the legislature.

If it be assumed (and we do not express an opinion on the point) that the primary act has application to the Detroit schools, the authority to designate, purchase, and condemn sites is to be found in section 4665, subds. 4-6, 4729 and 4730 as amended by Act No. 182, Pub. Acts. 1903.

Section 4665, subd. 4, gives the qualified voters, when lawfully assembled, authority · "to designate as hereinafter provided a site, etc. Subdivision 5 gives such voters, so assembled, authority to direct the purchase of sites, lawfully determined upon, and subd. 6, authority to vote a tax therefor.

Under the title "Sites for Schoolhouses," sections 4729 and 4730, as amended (and

1 The opinion filed on the original hearing in this case was withheld from publication pending the rehearing.

or until his office shall otherwise become vacant. The board may prescribe his duties and compensation: Provided, That when the office of secretary and superintendent shall be held by the same person, he shall receive no compensation for his services as secretary. The board, if it deem it expedient, may direct the superintendent to perform the duties of said office of secretary, and he shall thereupon be ex officio secretary of said board."

Under that Act on July 12, 1906, Mr. Wales C. Martindale was, by appropriate resolution of the board, appointed "superintendent for the ensuing term of three years, at the sum of $4,000 per year. The legislature in 1907, by Act No. 406, Local Acts 1907,

amended this section so as to read as follows:

"The board shall, at the first regular meeting in July in the year nineteen hundred nine after the passage of this act, and at the first regular meeting in July of every third year thereafter, appoint a suitable person as superintendent of the public schools under their control, who shall hold his office for the term of three years, or until his successor shall be appointed and enter upon the performance of his duties: Provided, That if such appointment shall not be made at the said first regular meeting in July, the same may be made at any subsequent regular meeting, but the term of office of the appointee shall commence and date from said first regular meeting in July: And provided further, That the office of the present incumbent shall not be deemed to have been vacated by this act, but he shall hold his office until the first regular meeting in July, nineteen hundred nine, as aforesaid, or until his successor shall be elected and enter upon the performance of his duties. The superintendent shall receive such salary as shall be fixed by the board. The said board may appoint a secretary of said board, who shall hold his office during the pleasure of said board, or until his office shall otherwise become vacant. The board may prescribe his duties and compensation: Provided, That when the office of secretary and superintendent shall be held by the same person, he shall receive no compensation for his services as secretary. The board, if it deem it expedient, may direct the superintendent to perform the duties of said office of secretary, and he shall thereupon be ex officio secretary of said board."

On July 11, 1907, the board of education, assuming that they had authority under the latter act, passed a resolution increasing the salary of Mr. Martindale to $6,000 per year, during the balance of the term for which he was elected; said increase to take effect from and after June 15, 1907. The Attorney General, upon the relation of certain citizens and taxpayers of the city of Detroit, filed this bill of complaint to enjoin the defendants from paying this increase of salary. A demurrer was interposed, sustained, and the bill dismissed.

GRANT, C. J. (after stating the facts).

"Statutes can apply to future transactions only, unless they are expressly given effect on previous transactions, or unless some of their terms cannot be met otherwise." I am unable to discern how any intention to change the status of Mr. Martindale's tenure or terms of service can be extorted from the clear language of this act. It plainly leaves both in force, to be completed under the law under which he was appointed for a definite time and at a definite salary, and leaves that law in force for that purpose, and enacts a new law to be applied only to his successor. But it is urged and this is the sole basis for the support of defendants' claim that the sole object of the legislature in giving the act immediate effect was to authorize immediate action under it. The order giving an act immediate effect is no part of the act. The bill was passed before the motion to give it immediate effect was made, and as passed it referred solely to future action by the board of education, to be taken more than two years thereafter. Can the plain intent and meaning of an act be changed by a motion which is no part of it and is made and carried after the bill was passed? Suppose the act had not been given im

ATTORNEY GENERAL, EX REL. ZACHARIAS, vs. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF DETROIT.

1. STATUTES CONSTRUCTION GIVING EFFECT TO WHOLE.

Statutes should be so construed, if possible, as to give full effect to every part and render no portion nugatory, every clause and word being presumed to have some force and meaning.

2. SCHOOLS DETROIT SCHOOLS SUPERINTENDENT SALARY-AMENDMENT OF STATUTE.

Act No. 406, Local Acts 1907, amending Act No. 392, Local Acts 1903, Section 7, by omitting therefrom the proviso limiting the salary payable to the superintendent of schools of Detroit to $4,000 per annum, which was given immediate effect, authorized the board of education to increase the salary of the superintendent then holding office and whose term of office does not expire until 1909, since otherwise there would be nothing upon which the immediate effect clause could operate. Grant, C. J., dissenting.

3. SAME CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

The Constitution of Michigan turns the whole subject of education over to the legislature and the subject is no part of the local self-government inherent in townships and municipalities, except so far as the legislature may choose to make it such.

SAME DETROIT CHARTER-TEACHERS' WAGES-ACTION OF BOARD OF ESTIMATES.

Since the primary school fund must, under the general laws of the State, be used to pay teachers' salaries, and the superintendent of schools of Detroit may, under the law authorizing his appointment, be a teacher, the action of the board of estimates in fixing the amount to be raised for the payment of his salary for a particular year is not binding on the school board, otherwise having legislative authority to fix his salary.

SAME CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DETROIT SCHOOLS SUPERINTENDENT SALARY-
INCREASE AFTER APPOINTMENT.

The superintendent of schools of Detroit is not a contractor, and an increase in his salary after the appointment for a particular term, effective during the unexpired portion of the term, looks to the future and not to the past, and hence does not violate section 21 article 4, of the Constitution. Grant, C. J., dissenting.

Appeal from Wayne; Hosmer, Murphy, Rohnert, and Donavan, J. J. Submitted June 10, 1908. (Docket No. 56). Decided November 30, 1908.

Bill by John E. Bird, Attorney General, on the relation of Allen H. Zacharias and others, to enjoin the Board of Education of the city of Detroit and Frank E. Doremus, controller, from paying an increase of salary. From a decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Elbridge F. Bacon, for complainant.

P. J. M. Hally (T. E. Tarsney, of counsel), for defendants.

Section 7, Act No. 392, Local Acts 1903, reads as follows:

"The said board shall, at the first regular meeting in July after the passage of this act, and at the first regular meeting in July of every third year thereafter, appoint a suitable person as superintendent of the public schools under their control, who shall hold his office for the term of three years, or until his successor shall be appointed and enter upon the performance of his duties: Provided, That if such appointment shall not be made at the first regular meeting in July, the same may be made at any subsequent regular meeting; but the term of office of the appointee shall commence and date from said first regular meeting in July: And provided further, That the office of the present incumbent shall not be deemed to have been vacated by this act, but he shall hold his office until the first regular meeting in July subsequent to the time when this act shall take effect, or until his successor shall be elected and enter upon the performance of his duties. The superintendent shall receive such salary as shall be fixed by the board: Provided, That the same shall not exceed four thousand dollars per annum. The said board may ap point a secretary of said board, who shall hold his office during the pleasure of said board,

Under that Act on July 12, 1906, Mr. Wales C. Martindale was, by appropriate resolution of the board, appointed "superintendent for the ensuing term of three years, at the sum of $4,000 per year." The legislature in 1907, by Act No. 406, Local Acts 1907,

amended this section so as to read as follows:

GRANT, C. J. (after stating the facts).

It will be observed that both the original and the amended section relate exclusively to the office of superintendent of schools, except that they also authorize the appointment of a secretary who may be the superintendent. The amended act amends the old act only in providing for the election of a new superintendent in 1909, at the termination of the term of the then superintendent. It does not in terms, and was not intended to, affect the term of office of the conditions under which the then incumbent was holding. I think that clause of the amending act reacting: "The superintendent shall_receive such salary as shall be fixed by the board" refers exclusively to the superintendent to be appointed under the act. The intent to authorize the expenditure of money and to increase the salary of an officer or employee who has been appointed for a specified term and at a specified salary, under a law which continues him in office for a specified time and at a specified salary, ought very clearly to appear. The act in question preserves the status quo of the superintendent who was then in office. It gives authority to appoint a new superintendent at or after a given time, and at such salary as the board may then authorize. This court said in Perrin v. Kellogg, 37 Mich. 316: "Statutes can apply to future transactions only, unless they are expressly given effect on previous transactions, or unless some of their terms cannot be met otherwise." I am unable to discern how any intention to change the status of Mr. Martindale's tenure or terms of service can be extorted from the clear language of this act. It plainly leaves both in force, to be completed under the law under which he was appointed for a definite time and at a definite salary, and leaves that law in force for that purpose, and enacts a new law to be applied only to his successor. But it is urged-and this is the sole basis for the support of defendants' claim that the sole object of the legislature in giving the act immediate effect was to authorize immediate action under it. The order giving an act immediate effect is no part of the act. The bill was passed before the motion to give it immediate effect was made, and as passed it referred solely to future action by the board of education, to be taken more than two years thereafter. Can the plain intent and meaning of an act be changed by a motion which is no part of it and is made and carried after the bill was passed? Suppose the act had not been given im

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