 | John Locke - Philosophy - 1722 - 640 pages
...Senfe. But as I call the other Senfation, fo I call this REFLEC1'ION, the /(&<« it affords being fuch only as the Mind gets by reflecting on its own Operations within it felf. By REFL ECT1ON then, in the following part of this Difcourfe, •! would be underftood to... | |
 | John Locke - Knowledge, Theory of - 1768 - 418 pages
...Man has wholly in himfelf : And tho' it be not Senfe, as having nothing to do with external Objects; yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called Internal Senfe. But as I call the other Senfation, fo I call this REFLECTION ; the Ideas it affords being fuch... | |
 | John Locke - Knowledge, Theory of - 1796 - 556 pages
...man has wholly in himfelf; and though it be not fenfe, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal fenfe. But as I call the other fenfation, fo I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being fuch... | |
 | John Locke - Knowledge, Theory of - 1796 - 560 pages
...fenfe. But as I call the other fenfafion, fo I call this RE FLECTION, the ideas it affords being 'fuch only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itfelf. By reflection then, in the following part of this difcourfe, I would be undcrItood to mean... | |
 | John Locke - 1801 - 950 pages
...man has wholly in himfelf ; and though it be not fenfe as having nothing to do with external objefts, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal fenfe. But as I call the other Senfatton, fo I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being fuch... | |
 | John Locke - Knowledge, Theory of - 1801 - 986 pages
...man has wholly in himfelf ; and though it be not fenfe as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal fenfe. But as I call the other Senfation, fo I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being fuch... | |
 | John Locke - Knowledge, Theory of - 1801 - 340 pages
...fenfe. But as I call the other Senfanon, fo I call this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being fuch only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itfelf. By REFLECTION, then, in the following part of this difcourfe, I would be underftood to mean,... | |
 | John Locke - Knowledge, Theory of - 1808 - 346 pages
...has wholly in himr self; and though it be not sense, (as having nothing to do with external objects,) yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense, being that notice which the mind takes of its own operations and the manner of them. I use the term... | |
 | 1810 - 326 pages
...reflection ; by the first we acquire the knowledge of external objects, and by the second, " such ideas as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself." There can be little doubt that this excessive generalization. of the sources of all our knowledge proceeded... | |
 | Dugald Stewart - Philosophy - 1811 - 590 pages
...has wholly in " himself: And though it be not sense, as having nothing " to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and " might properly enough be called internal sense. But as "Icallthe other sensation, so I call this REFLECTION; (• the ideas it affords being such only as... | |
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This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself: and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. 
