Statement and Inference, with Other Philosophical Papers, Volume 1Clarendon Press, 1926 - Logic |
Contents
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Common terms and phrases
abstract activity adjective analysis Aness appre apprehension Aristotelian Aristotle asserted attribute belong Bness Bywater called College common conception confusion connexion consciousness Cook Wilson copula corresponding criticism cyclists definition denoted differentiation difficulty distinction distinguished elastic elements existence expression F. H. Bradley fact fallacy feeling Fyfield genus geometry given grammatical H. A. Prichard hypothetical idea implies inference instance John Cook Wilson judgement kind knowledge language lecture letter logical subject mathematical mathematicians meaning ment mental image merely metaphysical mind modern nature Nicomachean Ethics nominative not-Aness noun object opinion ordinary Oriel Oxford particular perception perhaps philosophic Plato Posterior Analytics premiss Prior Analytics problem proposition question reality reason relation represent Romanesque seems sensation sense sentence Siebengebirge Socrates species statement subject and predicate supposed syllogism symbol term theory thing thought tion true unity universal verb verbal form whole wife word τὸ
Popular passages
Page 54 - But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof they are copies or resemblances; which things exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance.
Page 22 - is the science of the operations of the understanding which are subservient to the estimation of evidence; both the process itself of proceeding from known truths to unknown, and all other intellectual operations in so far as auxiliary to this.
Page 277 - Bradley's definition of judgment, as " the act which refers an ideal content to a reality beyond the act...
Page 84 - Alius actus potest dici iudicativus, quo intellectus non tantum apprehendit obiectum sed etiam illi assentit vel dissentit. Et iste actus est tantum respectu complexi, quia nulli assentimus per intellectum nisi quod verum reputamus, nec dissentimus nisi quod falsum aestimamus. Et sic patet quod respectu complexi potest esse duplex actus, scilicet actus apprehensivus et actus iudicativus.
Page li - When you have seen one of my days, you have seen a whole year of my life; they go round and round like the blind horse in the mill, only he has the satisfaction of fancying, he makes a progress, and gets some ground; my eyes are open enough to see the same dull prospect, and to know that having made four-andtwenty steps more, I shall be just where I was...
Page 111 - Wilson maintains (1926, pp. 119 f.) that 'in the statement "glass is elastic", if the matter of inquiry was elasticity and the question was what substances possessed the property of elasticity, glass . . . would no longer be subject, and the kind of stress which fell upon "elastic...
Page 77 - Guido, with a burnt stick in his hand, demonstrating on the smooth paving-stones of the path, that the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides.
Page xix - Andrews honoured itself and him, in 1906, by conferring on him the degree of Doctor of Laws, honoris causa...
Page 350 - But now take, for instance, redness and blueness, which we naturally call species of colour. If we eliminate all that is meant by colour, nothing whatever is left, or, if we suppose some differentiating element left, it would have to be something different from colour. Thus the difference between red and blue would not be one of colour, whereas it is colour in which they agree and colour in which they differ. We cannot give verbal expression to the differentia which constitutes the species, except...
Page 29 - Our experience of knowing then being the presupposition of any inquiry we can undertake, we cannot make knowing itself a subject of inquiry in the sense of asking what knowing is. We can make knowing a subject of inquiry but not of that kind of inquiry. We can for instance inquire how we come to know in general, or to know in any department of knowledge.