M. Tulli Ciceronis Academica |
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Common terms and phrases
Academic Academica aliquid Antiochus Arcesilas Aristotle atque Atticus autem Brut Cant Carneades Cato Catulus caussa Chrysippus Cicero clause Clitomachus codd coni corr dicere Diog Draeger eius enim Epicurean Epicurus esset etiam Greek H Bait haec Harl Hortensius igitur illa illi illud inquit Introd ipsa ipse ista Lael Latin Lucullus Madv Madvig mihi modo natura neque nihil nisi nobis Nonius nunc omnia omnis Panaetius passage percipi Philo philosophy phrase Plato Plin posse possit potest primum Pyrrho quae quaedam quaestor quam quibus quid quidem Quint quod rebus rerum Sceptics sense sensibus Sext Sextus sint Stoics sunt tamen tion Tusc uera ueri uero uerum uideri uidetur uisa uisum uitae Varro verb words Xenocrates Zeller Zeno δὲ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τὸ τοῦ τῶν
Popular passages
Page 176 - verum operi longo fas est obrepere somnum. 360 ut pictura poesis : erit quae si propius stes te capiat magis, et quaedam si longius abstes...
Page 56 - Nature is always too strong for principle. And though a PYRRHONIAN may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings, the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples, and leave him the same, in every point of action and speculation, with the philosophers of every other sect, or with those who never concerned themselves in any philosophical researches.
Page 243 - And what shoulder, and what art, Could twist the sinews of thy heart? And when thy heart began to beat, What dread hand? and what dread feet? What the hammer? what the chain? In what furnace was thy brain?
Page 178 - Quam multa vident pictores in umbris 10 et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus! quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati! qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut Andromacham, cum id nos ne suspicemur quidem.
Page 56 - It is a question of fact whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects resembling them. How shall this question be determined? By experience, surely, as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is and must be entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. The supposition of such a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning.
Page 233 - Speak to Him thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet — Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet. God is law, say the wise; O Soul, and let us rejoice, For if He thunder by law, the thunder is yet His voice. Law is God, say some: no God at all, says the fool; For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool...
Page 56 - On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge any thing, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence.
Page 333 - A more distinct gain to scholarship is Mr Reid's able and thorough edition of the De Amicitia of Cicero, a work of which, whether we regard the exhaustive introduction or the instructive and most suggestive commentary, it would be difficult to speak too highly. . . . When we come to the commeniary, we are only amazed by its fulness in proportion to its bulk.
Page 171 - Cum Alexandriae pro quaestore " inquit " essem, fuit Antiochus mecum, et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi Heraclitus Tyrius, qui et Clitomachum multos annos et Philonem audierat, homo sane in ista philosophia, quae nunc prope dimissa revocatur, probatus et nobilis ; cum quo Antiochum saepe disputantem audiebam, sed utrumque leniter. Et quidem isti libri duo Philonis, de quibus heri dictum a Catulo est...
Page 116 - Fuit ergo iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex, una de vita et moribus, altera de natura et rebus occultis, tertia de disserendo et quid verum, 1 quid falsum, quid rectum in oratione pravumve, quid consentiens, quid repugnans esset 2 iudicando.