A Manual of Logic: Deductive and Inductive |
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abstraction accidental accidents agree animal antecedent argument Aristotle asserts attribute cate categorical proposition Celarent cloth clusion common term conception conclusion consequent considered constitutes contradictory contraposition converse converted simply convertend copula Darii definition denotes differentia disjunctive disjunctive proposition disjunctive syllogism distributed divided division Dr Brown's Edition enthymeme essence excluded existence expressed extension fallacy false Ferio flowers fourth figure generalisation genus gisms Hence implied inductive inference infima judgment kinds Laws of Thought legitimate logical logicians major premiss major proposition major term matter means metaphysical middle term mind minor term modality moods nature negative proposition notion noun nouns substantive objects particular affirmative particular negative planet proprium reasoning reduced reducend relation rules second figure sense signifies simply convertible singular sion sorites species subaltern subject and predicate substance things third figure tion tive triangle true truth universal affirmative universal negatives universal proposition universal term virtue vols whole words
Popular passages
Page 139 - Again ; the mathematical postulate, that " things which are equal to the same are equal to one another," is similar to the form of the syllogism in logic, which unites things agreeing in the middle term.
Page 46 - There are not some names which are exclusively genera, and others which are exclusively species or differentiae; but the same name is referred to one or another Predicable, according to the subject of which it is predicated on the particular occasion. Animal, for instance, is a genus with respect to Man or John ; a species with respect to substance or Being. The words genus, species, &c., are therefore relative terms ; they are...
Page 46 - It is to be remarked of these distinctions," says the author we are quoting, " that they express not what the predicate is in its own meaning, but what relation it bears to the subject of which it happens on the particular occasion to be predicated.
Page 201 - But Euathlus retorted this dilemma, thus : ' Either I shall gain the cause, or lose it : if I gain the cause, then nothing will be due to you, according to the sentence of the judge ; but if I lose the cause, nothing will be due to you...