Mental Science: A Compendium of Psychology, and the History of Philosophy, Designed as a Text-book for High-schools and Colleges |
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Common terms and phrases
abstract accompanied according acquired action active acute animal arise Aristotle asso association beauty belief body brain called cause cerebellum character circumstances colour combined condition connexion consciousness contrast degree discrimination distance distinct doctrine effect element emotion energy excitement exercise exertion experience expression fact farther favour fibres force give grey matter habit human idea ideal impression influence intellectual intensity J. S. MILL knowledge liberty mastication means medulla oblongata memory ment mental mind mode moral motive movements muscles muscular feelings nature nerves nervous objects odours operation organs papillæ Parmenides peculiar perception person physical Plato Platonic Realism pleasure and pain present pungency pursuit quadrupeds reflex action regards retentiveness retina sensation sense sensibility sight smell sound Spinal Cord spontaneity stimulation Sublime substance supposed sympathy taste theory things thought tion touch tympanum visible vitreous humour volition voluntary white matter
Popular passages
Page 22 - ... consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them. But I deny that I can abstract...
Page 22 - Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting their ideas, they best can tell : for myself I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them.
Page 407 - Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from any particular action.
Page 22 - I find indeed I have a faculty of imagining, or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and color.
Page 21 - Words become general by being made the signs of general ideas : and ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time, and place, and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence.
Page 90 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
Page 420 - A determination by motives cannot, to our understanding, escape from necessitation. Nay, were we even to admit as true, what we cannot think as possible, still the doctrine of a motiveless volition would be only casualism ; and the free acts of an indifferent, are, morally and rationally, as worthless as the pre-ordered passions of a determined, will.
Page 21 - I think we may say, the sorting of them under names, is the workmanship of the understanding, taking occasion from the similitude it observes amongst them, to make abstract general ideas, and set them up in the mind, with names annexed to them, as patterns or forms...
Page 200 - It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent.
Page 204 - Along with whatever any Intelligence knows it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself.