The Essentials of Logic: Being Ten Lectures on Judgment and Inference |
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The Essentials of Logic; Being Ten Lectures on Judgment and Inference Bernard Bosanquet No preview available - 2013 |
The Essentials of Logic, Being Ten Lectures on Judgment and Inference Bernard Bosanquet No preview available - 2016 |
Common terms and phrases
abstract analyse animal Aristotle assertion attributes called Categorical claim colour common common-sense theory complete connection connotation Connotation and Denotation consists construction Copula corresponding course of consciousness definite denotation disjunction distinction distinguish elements existence explicit Subject expressed F. H. Bradley fact form of knowledge Formal Logic formal science given idea ideal content identity implies individual Induction inference instance interpretation Jevons judge judgment of perception kind LECTURE ledge logical pro major premise matter meaning men are mortal ment mental merely Mill Mill's mind momentary nature necessity negation objects obliged to think observation particular Particular Judgment Philosophy present perception proper name properties proposition psychical image purpose question real world recognise reference relation relative clause Rosa Rubiginosa sense sense-perception sentence separate speak species square Subject and Predicate Subjective Idealism suggested Syllogism things thought tion true of Reality truth Venn verb whole words world of knowledge
Popular passages
Page 139 - Disestablishment, and I think, therefore, that Gladstone will." I do not express any connecting link, merely because every one sees at once that I am inferring from the intentions of some Liberal leaders to those of another. If the terms are really particulars, " X is A, Y is B, Z is C," one is helpless ; they do not point to anything further at all ; there is no bridge from one to the Other. Inference cannot possibly take place except through the medium of an identity or universal which acts as...
Page 4 - No truth therefore is more certain, more independent of all others, and less in need of proof than this, that all that exists for knowledge, and therefore this whole world, is only object in relation to subject, perception of a perceiver, in a word, idea.
Page 4 - THE world is my idea:" — this is a truth which holds good for everything that lives and knows, though man alone can bring it into reflective and abstract consciousness. If he really does this, he has attained to philosophical wisdom. It then becomes clear and certain to him that what he knows is not a sun and an earth, but only an eye that sees a sun, a hand that feels an earth...
Page 4 - ... idea — ie, only in relation to something else, the consciousness which is himself. If any truth can be asserted a priori it is this ; for it is the expression of the most general form of all possible and thinkable experience, — a form which is more general than time or space or causality, for they all presuppose it ; and each of these...
Page 36 - List rather to the deeds I did for mortals ; how, being fools before, I made them wise and true in aim of soul. And let me tell you, — not as taunting men, But teaching you the intention of my gifts, — How, first beholding, they beheld in vain, And, hearing, heard not, but, like shapes in dreams, Mixed all things wildly down the tedious time, Nor knew to build a house against the sun With wicketed sides, nor any wood-craft knew, But lived, like silly ants, beneath the ground In hollow caves unsunned....
Page 88 - ... these attributes. But it can be predicated only of the subjects. What we call men, are the subjects, the individual Stiles and Nokes; not the qualities by which their humanity is constituted. The name, therefore, is said to signify the subjects directly, the attributes indirectly; it denotes the subjects, and implies, or involves, or indicates, or as wo shall say henceforth connotes, the attributes.
Page 104 - I will not try to deal with now, in the fact that however much we refer to things, we have nothing to work with intellectually but our ideas of them, and in some types of Judgment the reference to real things is difficult to trace. Mill further emphasises this by showing, that what we assert in ordinary general Judgment is co-existence of attributes. 2 " Now when we say, Man is mortal, we mean that wherever these various mental and physical phenomena (the attributes of man) are all found, then we...
Page 91 - From the preceding observations it will easily be collected, that whenever the names given to objects convey any information, that is, whenever they have properly any meaning, the meaning resides not in what they denote, but in what they connote. The only names of objects which connote nothing are proper names; and these have, strictly speaking, no signification.
Page 36 - With wicketed sides, nor any woodcraft knew, But lived, like silly ants, beneath the ground In hollow caves unsunned. There, came to them No steadfast sign of winter, nor of spring Flower-perfumed, nor of summer full of fruit, But blindly and lawlessly they did all things, Until I taught them how the stars do rise And set in mystery, and devised for them Number, the inducer of philosophies, The synthesis of Letters, and, beside, The artificer of all things, Memory, That sweet Muse-mother.
Page 87 - The name or concept has no reality in living language or living thought, except when referred to its place in a proposition or judgment. We ought not to think of propositions as built up by putting words or names together, but of words or names as distinguished though not separable elements in propositions. Aristotle takes the simple and straightforward view. " A term is the element into which a proposition is broken up, such as subject and predicate.