Mental Science: A Compendium of Psychology, and the History of Philosophy, Designed as a Text-book for High-schools and Colleges |
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Common terms and phrases
abstract according acquired action active acute animal arise Aristotle asso association beauty belief body brain called cause cerebellum character circumstances colour combined condition connexion consciousness degree discrimination distance distinct doctrine effect elements emotion energy excitement exercise exertion existence experience expression fact farther favour fibres force give grey matter habit human idea ideal impression influence intel intellectual J. S. Mill knowledge liberty mastication means medulla oblongata memory ment mental mind mode moral motive movements muscles muscular feelings nature nerves nervous objects odours operation organs papillæ Parmenides peculiar perception person physical Plato Platonic Realism pleasure and pain present pursuit quadrupeds reflex action regards retentiveness retina sensation sense sensibility sight Similarity smell Sokrates sound Spinal Cord spontaneity stimulation Sublime substance supposed sympathy taste theory things thoughts tion touch tympanum visible vitreous humour volition voluntary white matter
Popular passages
Page 207 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Page 96 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
Page 203 - The table I write on I say exists, that is I see and feel it, and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it.
Page 75 - declares, that " a very considerable number of the facts may be brought under the following principle, namely, that states of pleasure are connected with an increase, and states of pain with an abatement, of some, or all, of the vital functions.
Page 426 - A determination by motives cannot, to our understanding, escape from necessitation. Nay, were we even to admit as true, what we cannot think as possible, still the doctrine of a motiveless volition would be only casualism ; and the free acts of an indifferent, are, morally and rationally, as worthless as the pre-ordered passions of a determined, will.
Page 210 - Along with whatever any intelligence knows it must, as the ground or condition of its knowledge, have some cognisance of itself.
Page 68 - That all that is conceivable in thought, lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must.
Page 85 - Actions, sensations, and states of feeling, occurring together or in close succession, tend to grow together or cohere in such a way that when any one of them is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea.
Page 92 - Our ideas spring up, or exist, in the order in which the sensations existed, of which they are the copies. This is the general law of the "Association of Ideas"; by which term, let it be remembered, nothing is here meant to be expressed, but the order of occurrence.
Page 316 - The passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly...