Mental Science: A Compendium of Psychology, and the History of Philosophy : Designed as a Text-book for High-schools and Colleges |
Contents
1 | |
3 | |
5 | |
7 | |
10 | |
11 | |
13 | |
16 | |
17 | |
21 | |
22 | |
28 | |
36 | |
41 | |
45 | |
47 | |
56 | |
67 | |
98 | |
99 | |
103 | |
107 | |
109 | |
159 | |
165 | |
181 | |
194 | |
195 | |
198 | |
207 | |
216 | |
222 | |
227 | |
235 | |
236 | |
250 | |
261 | |
349 | |
365 | |
370 | |
379 | |
386 | |
392 | |
407 | |
1 | |
3 | |
7 | |
8 | |
9 | |
13 | |
19 | |
23 | |
27 | |
29 | |
30 | |
41 | |
47 | |
51 | |
53 | |
59 | |
65 | |
85 | |
96 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
accompanied according acquired action active acute adhesiveness animal arise asso association beauty belief body brain called cause cerebellum character circumstances colour combined condition connected connexion consciousness contraction degree depression discrimination distance distinct doctrine effect element emotion energy excitement exercise exertion experience expression fact farther favour fear fibres force give grey matter habit human idea ideal impression influence intel intellectual intensity J. S. MILL knowledge mastication means medulla oblongata memory ment mental mind modes moral motive movements muscles muscular feelings nature nerves nervous objects odours operation organs papillæ peculiar perception person physical Plato pleasure and pain present pursuit quadrupeds reflex action regards retentiveness retina sensations Sensations of Sight sense sensibility sight smell sound Spinal Cord spontaneity stimulation Sublime supposed sympathy taste tender theory things thoughts tion touch tympanum visible vitreous humour volition voluntary white matter
Popular passages
Page 207 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.
Page 75 - declares, that " a very considerable number of the facts may be brought under the following principle, namely, that states of pleasure are connected with an increase, and states of pain with an abatement, of some, or all, of the vital functions.
Page 29 - ... that all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them. As I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters...
Page 413 - Volition, it is plain, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from any particular action.
Page 64 - That there is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion.
Page 68 - That all that is conceivable in thought, lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true, but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must.
Page 64 - That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of the mind.
Page 85 - Action, sensations, and states of feeling, occurring together or in close succession, tend to grow together or cohere in such a way that when any one of them is afterwards presented to the mind, the others are apt to be brought up in idea.
Page 223 - All that can be said is, that there remains a presumption in favour of those conditions of life, in which men generally appear most cheerful and contented. For though the apparent happiness of mankind be not always a true measure of their real happiness, it is the best measure we have.
Page 411 - I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner : liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent, as for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have- liberty to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments, and though...