Knowledge, Belief and Certitude: An Inquiry with Conclusions |
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Common terms and phrases
abstract knowledge actual agnosticism assertion astronomy body brain called causation cause certainty character common knowledge common-sense conception conclusion concrete consider data of consciousness definition distinction doubt error existence experience external world feeling force fore-brain fundamental certitudes given ground hedonism Hegel human mind Ibid ideal ideas imagine immediate infinite infinitely divisible inquiry intellect intelligence intuition Kant kind knowledge and belief known law of Contradiction law of Identity laws of thought ledge logic mathematics matter means Metaphysic moral nature of knowledge ness never notion objective science objects observation perceive perception phenomena philosophy physical sciences pleasure and pain possible present psychology question real knowledge real things reason recognised regarded religion scepticism Schopenhauer scientific sciousness seems sensations sense separate Shadworth Hodgson space subject-matter supposed teleology theory thought three certitudes tion true truth ultimate unity universe visible and tangible volition whole Wilhelm Wundt word Wundt
Popular passages
Page 255 - While we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe, after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or fire burn ; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any determination, which we may form, with regard to the / origin of worlds, and the situation of nature, from, and to
Page 221 - SINCE the mind, in all its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other immediate object but its own ideas, which it alone does or can contemplate ; it is evident, that our knowledge is only conversant about them.
Page 254 - It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects, resembling them: How shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent.
Page 254 - Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something, as the cause of our perceptions ; a notion so imperfect, that no sceptic will think it worth while to contend against it.
Page 334 - All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.
Page 5 - It is the little rift within the lute, That by and by will make the music mute, And ever widening slowly silence all.
Page 296 - We were judging phenomena and were condemning them, and throughout we proceeded as if the self-contradictory could not be real. But this was surely to have and to apply an absolute criterion. For consider : you can scarcely propose to be quite passive when presented with statements about reality. You can hardly take the position of admitting any and every nonsense to be truth, truth absolute and entire, at least so far as you know. For, if you think at all so as to discriminate between truth and...
Page 297 - Hence to think is to judge, and to judge is to criticise, and to criticise is to use a criterion of reality. And surely to doubt this would be mere blindness or confused self-deception. But, if so, it is clear that, in rejecting the inconsistent as appearance, we are applying a positive knowledge of the ultimate nature of things. Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion.
Page 334 - One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward / sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that we ./ have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life.
Page 257 - It is morally certain that there is a God, etc," but "I am morally certain, etc." In other words, belief in a God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral sentiment that as there is little danger of my losing the latter, there is equally little cause for fear that the former can ever be taken from me.