The Principles of Psychology, Volume 2D. Appleton, 1892 - Psychology |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
accompanying action æsthetic antecedent arise asserted attri attributes axiom become before-known body cause changes in consciousness chapter classification coexistent positions cognition colour complex conceived conception conclusion connatural connexion connotations consciousness of space considered constituting correlations definite degree developed elements equal established excited existence experiences external eyes fact faint feelings further Hence ideas implies impressions induction inference intensive quantities intuition involved kind known less magnitudes manifest mental metaphysicians mind motion muscular tension nature nervous ness nexions objective correlations Objective Science observe pain particular perceived perception phenomena predicated premiss present produced proposition quantitative reasoning reached recognized reflex action rela relation of coexistence relation of ideas represented resistance respect retina riences sciousness sensations sentiments sequence sequent simultaneous Sir William Hamilton sound structure successive suppose surface syllogism tactual things thought tion touch truth unlike visual visual perception vivid aggregate word
Popular passages
Page 22 - IF a side of any triangle be produced, the exterior angle is equal to the two interior and opposite angles ; and the three interior angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles.
Page 328 - Here, therefore, we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species, which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated THOUGHTS or IDEAS.
Page 60 - All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal, the subject and predicate of the major premise are connotative terms, denoting objects and connoting attributes.
Page 321 - I can imagine a man with two heads, or the upper parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from the rest of the body. But then, whatever hand or eye I imagine, it must have some particular shape and colour.
Page 342 - We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false, it would imply a contradiction, and could never be distinctly conceived by the mind.
Page 342 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.
Page 329 - By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.